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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous studies (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; 
Brock and Kleidon 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 
1990; Jain and Joh 1988; McInish and Wood 1992; 
Wood et al. 1985) examine the intraday pattern of 
quote- and trade-related variables on the stock 
market, but little research examines the intraday 
pattern of warrants in a limit order market. While 
the intraday behavior of derivative securities has 
been thoroughly examined on the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE), where there are 
competing market makers, little research 
investigates the intraday behavior of such securities 
traded in a pure order-driven market. The intraday 
patterns of spread and volume do not only exist in 
quoted markets such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) or the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) 
but have also been documented on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(HKSE), which operate without market makers 
(Lehman and Modest 1994; Ahn and Cheung 1999).  
Because options and stocks provide different 
advantages to traders and, given the presence of 
asymmetric information among traders, one would 
expect that options and stocks would exhibit 
different trading patterns (e.g., Black 1975).  It was 
hypothesized that, if the market structure influences 
intraday patterns (Chan, Chung, and Johnson 1995), 
both warrants and stocks should exhibit a similar 
intraday pattern of spreads and volume after 
controlling for these influences. Therefore, in this 
study, the intraday patterns of bid-ask spreads and 
order flows of warrants and their underlying stocks 
are compared. 
In this research, we ask the question of how the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)’s underlying 
market architecture affects the intraday patterns of 
derivative securities. We do this by using the limit 
order book of the SET, which provides a good 
platform for comparing the trading characteristics 
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of warrants and their underlying stocks because 
both these securities are traded in the same market 
venue and have identical trading rules. Therefore, 
the impact of the trading protocol on intraday 
variation and an informed trader’s decision to buy 
warrants or stocks is controlled. By controlling for 
the impact of market structure, this present study 
sheds light on the competition among limit order 
traders and strategic order submissions in both 
warrants and stocks trading. The findings of this 
study should be of interest to regulators, traders, 
and international portfolio managers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. The next section reviews the pertinent 
literature and develops the hypotheses. This is 
followed by a description of the market architecture 
of the SET, the sample data, and research 
methodology. The fourth section presents the 
empirical results of the intraday patterns, the 
adverse selection component, the relationship 
between spread and depths, liquidity immediacy, 
and the market order submission. The final section 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
 
Many studies show that trading mechanisms affect 
the intraday pattern of trade and quote variables. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) find that the 
distribution of open-to-open returns has greater 
dispersion, higher mode, and fatter tails than the 
distribution of close-to-close returns. They argue 
that the low variation of close-to-close returns 
results from market makers trying to stabilize prices 
and alleviate their cumulative inventory imbalance. 
They conclude that open-to-open returns capture 
opening trade price behavior in a call market, but 
market makers’ influence on price is best examined 
using close-to-close returns. Chan, Christie, and 
Schultz (1995) and Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995) 
argue that differences between the market power of 
NYSE specialists and NASDAQ and CBOE dealers 
cause intraday variations in bid-ask spreads. They 
find that bid-ask spreads for NYSE stocks follow a U-
shaped pattern, while spreads of NASDAQ stocks 
and CBOE options traded near the market close are 
narrower. 
Besides the trading mechanisms, intraday 
patterns are also associated with the behavior of 
informed traders, especially when and what they 
trade. Black (1975) argues that options trading 
should provide two advantages: financial leverage 
and volatility trading. Several studies (e.g., Anthony 
1988; Manaster and Rendleman 1982; Stephan and 
Whaley 1990; Vijh 1990) investigate the 
interrelationship between option and stock markets, 
but they are unable to pinpoint where informed 
traders initiate their trades. Chan et al. (2002) 
suggest that informed traders hesitate to initiate 
trade in options markets due to lower liquidity in 
these markets. 
Easley et al. (1998) show that informed traders 
use depth and the availability of leverage to decide 
how and where to trade, i.e., they may pool and 
trade in both option and stock markets or separate 
their trades in one market. Brock and Kleidon (1992) 
suggest that the non-trading period during market 
closure causes the price to deviate from equilibrium. 
Therefore, the degree of asymmetric information is 
largest at the opening. Moreover, since asymmetric 
information is resolved through trading, liquidity 
traders may trade more around the closing period 
than in other periods. For example, index-tracking 
funds rebalance their portfolio right before market 
closures to minimize tracking error.  
The market closure impact implied by Brock 
and Kleidon (1992) is not limited to the stock 
market. Other markets, such as the options market, 
should exhibit a similar U-shaped bid-ask spread 
pattern as in the stock market. However, because the 
values of derivative securities are determined solely 
by the movement of their underlying assets, the 
intraday patterns of trade- and quote-related 
variables for options and stocks should not be 
different, no matter where informed traders initiate 
their trades. As a result, the following hypothesis is 
expected to hold.  
H1: Warrants and stocks have similar intraday 
patterns of trade- and quote-related variables. 
A number of studies document both intraday 
and interday U-shaped patterns of trading volume. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990), for example, find that trading 
volume patterns result from the strategic behavior 
of liquidity traders and informed traders. Traders 
adjust their transactions to avoid times when 
trading costs are high. Informed traders only trade 
when they can profit from their information, while 
market makers, who have access to all order flow 
information, set prices to reflect the asset value. If 
traders’ performance with the market return is 
measured, trading is just a zero-sum game. This 
means that informed traders will trade and profit 
from liquidity traders. Therefore, for the price to be 
informative, the presence of a liquidity trader is 
necessary. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) argue that 
the private information of informed traders becomes 
less valuable over time because portions of private 
information are revealed to the public through 
public announcements. Liquidity traders, therefore, 
have an incentive to postpone their trades during a 
period when informed traders remain in the market.  
Conversely, neither the game theory model of 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) nor the model of 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) implies the higher 
spread and volume at market opening and closing. 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) point out that passive 
portfolio managers choose to trade at the end of the 
trading day because market indices are computed 
using closing prices and the performance of these 
funds is measured by how closely they track an 
index. Moreover, Brock and Kleidon’s model predicts 
that liquidity risk is higher when holding non-
tradable securities. In addition, investors may opt to 
trade at the market open in order to adjust their 
portfolio imbalances during the prior non-trading 
interval and trade again at the market close to 
adjust their portfolio for optimal overnight holding. 
This results in higher trading activity at the 
beginning and end of a trading interval. The 
arguments of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster 
and Viswanathan (1993), and Brock and Kleidon 
(1992) lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Trading volume is higher at market opening 
and closing than at other times. 
Observing high volatility during trading periods 
does not reveal the source of volatility. On one hand, 
high volatility during trading periods may stem from 
temporary price changes due to liquidity trading. On 
the other hand, new information, which arrives 
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frequently during business hours, can cause high 
volatility during trading periods. French and Roll 
(1986) compare price volatility during a special 
event when the New York Stock Exchange closed for 
2 days and other business entities stayed opened, to 
price volatility over a normal weekday period. It was 
assumed that if information is the only source of 
volatility the variance over a 2-day exchange holiday 
would double the normal weekday variance. Their 
results show that the variance of a 2-day exchange 
holiday was only 14% higher than the variance of a 
normal period. This result shows that trading is also 
an important source of volatility.  
Harvey and Huang (1991) show that the pattern 
of volatility variation may reflect information flow. 
They find that U.S. macroeconomic announcements 
on Thursday and Friday affect the U.S. foreign 
exchange market, and volatility is higher for all 
currencies during the first hour of Friday trading. In 
addition, a contagion effect causes an increase or 
decrease of volatility in one market as a result of 
activity in another market. Bernile, Hu, and Tang 
(2016), who examine informed trading ahead of U.S. 
macro-news announcements, find evidence that is 
consistent with informed trading. 
King and Wadhwani (1990) propose a model 
where traders in one market infer information from 
another market, resulting in market integration. 
They predict a volatility drop when an associated 
market closes. Their results show that the volatility 
on the London market declined when the U.S. stock 
markets were shut down on Wednesdays during the 
second half of 1968. Chan et al. (1996) find that 
European stocks listed on the U.S. stock market have 
high volatility during the early morning compared to 
American stocks with similar daily volume and 
volatility.  
Past studies have shown that volatility is 
determined by trading activity and information flow. 
Moreover, liquidity traders cluster their trades and 
attract informed traders around the opening and 
closing periods. Therefore, the intraday pattern of 
volatility should be similar to that of volume. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Volatility is high at the opening and closing 
of trading sessions. 
Previous literature view the bid-ask spread as a 
measure of trading costs or compensation to market 
makers for order processing costs, inventory costs, 
and asymmetric information costs. Garman (1976) 
and Ho and Stoll (1981) show that market makers 
face an inventory imbalance due to the uncertainty 
of buy and sell order arrivals. Therefore, inventory 
imbalance is most severe at the close of the market. 
To mitigate the inventory imbalance problem, 
dealers use bid-ask spreads to manage their 
inventory by increasing the bid or lowering the ask 
quote to attract buy and sell orders from others. 
Madhavan (1992) points out that the asymmetric 
information problem is alleviated over the trading 
day because trading is a process that incorporates 
both private and public information into the price. 
As a result, the asymmetric information component 
in the bid-ask spread declines and causes the total 
bid-ask spread to fall throughout the trading day. 
Easley, Lopez, and O’Hara (2012) consider order flow 
to be toxic if liquidity is provided at a loss. They 
develop a measure of flow toxicity based on the 
volume synchronized probability of informed 
trading for capturing the microstructure dynamics 
of asymmetric information. Foucault, Kozhan, and 
Tham (2016) find that more frequent toxic arbitrage 
opportunities and faster responses to these 
opportunities impair liquidity. 
Although McInish and Wood (1992) find a U-
shaped pattern of spreads for stocks listed on the 
NYSE, the intraday patterns of spreads found on 
other exchanges are different. Chan, Chung and 
Johnson (1995) compare the intraday pattern of 
spreads for actively traded CBOE options and their 
NYSE-traded underlying stocks and find that the bid-
ask spread pattern of options is different from the 
pattern of their underlying stocks. While both 
options and stocks have a widespread at the open, at 
the close, the spreads of options narrow, while the 
spreads of stocks widen again. They explain that the 
difference in spread variation arises from 
differences in the market architecture used by the 
two markets. On the CBOE, market makers compete 
with each other, whereas market making on the 
NYSE is monopolistic. In addition, Chan, Christie, 
and Schultz (1995) and Affleck-Graves et al. (1994) 
find that the bid-ask spread for NASDAQ stocks 
declines throughout the day. Based on these 
arguments, the following hypotheses are expected to 
hold.  
H4: The bid-ask spread is high at the opening 
and declines throughout the day.  
H5: Flow toxicity is high at the market opening.  
Copeland and Galai (1983) point out that bid and 
ask quotes placed by market makers is a straddle 
option, where the difference of straddle prices forms 
the bid-ask spread. Lee et al. (1993) find that during 
an earnings announcement period specialists quote 
a widespread with a small depth to counter their 
asymmetric information risk. In a pure limit order 
market, liquidity providers receive the spread as 
compensation for their inventory costs and adverse 
selection cost. Therefore, the availability of depth 
should be negatively associated with the presence of 
informed traders. In addition, because the degree of 
asymmetric information declines over the course of 
trading, the depth in a limit order book should 
increase throughout the trading day. This leads to 
the following hypotheses. 
H6: Depth is low at the market opening and 
increases throughout the day. 
H7: There is an inverse relationship between 
bid-ask spread and depth. 
Brock and Kleidon (1992) argue that fund 
managers who replicate an index movement are 
likely to submit market orders to execute their 
trades around the market close because the index 
level is generally computed using closing prices. 
Moreover, day traders use market orders to close 
their positions around the closing period. Therefore, 
if the market order ratio is defined as the number of 
market orders to the number of limit orders 
submitted near the best quotes, i.e., at or above the 
best three quotes level on the limit order book, the 
following hypothesis should hold.  
H8: Market order ratio is low at the opening and 
increases throughout the day. 
Easley, Lopez, and O’Hara (2012) argue that 
order flow is toxic if the liquidity provider offers 
liquidity at a loss. They suggest a procedure to 
measure a flow toxicity based on the volume 
synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN). 
VPIN is useful in measuring the high-frequency 
dynamics of asymmetric information that are 
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associated with variables such as spread, depth, 
volatility, and order submission strategy. While the 
bid-ask spread compensates limit order traders for 
providing liquidity immediacy, it is a cost for market 
order traders. Van Ness, Van Ness, and Yildiz (2017) 
investigate the relation between high-frequency 
trading, order flow toxicity, stock price volatility 
during normal and high order flow toxicity periods. 
Employing the VPIN measure, they find a negative 
relation between high-frequency trading and order 
flow toxicity. Biais et al. (1995), Chung et al. (1999), 
and Bae et al. (2003) find that, when the bid-ask 
spread is narrow and the order size is small, market 
orders are used more often than limit orders. In 
other words, market orders are used when the cost 
of doing so is low, and limit orders are used when 
the cost is high. In addition, among limit order 
traders, the competition to provide liquidity is 
higher when the compensation (i.e., spread) is high. 
As flow toxicity consumes liquidity, informed 
traders quickly submit their orders when liquidity is 
sufficiently available to minimize the price impact. 
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses. 
H9: Flow toxicity is positively associated with 
liquidity measured by spread, depth, market order 
flow ratio.  
H10: Flow toxicity is positively associated with 
volatility as the price is moved by trading of informed 
traders. 
 
3. MARKET ARCHITECTURE AND SAMPLE DATA 
 
The SET operates under an automated limit order 
trading system. Trading on the exchange occurs 
daily from Monday to Friday in two sessions from 
10:00 am to 12:30 pm and 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm. The 
trading system uses a call market mechanism to 
determine the closing price of the day and the 
opening price in each trading session. Traders can 
place several order types – limit, at-the-open, at-the-
close, immediate-or-cancel, fill-or-kill, and 
conditionally published orders.1 Since the trading 
system of the SET does not allow market orders to 
be submitted, traders demanding immediacy have to 
submit limit orders that immediately trade against 
an opposite limit order standing at the best quote. In 
this context, such orders are deemed to be market 
orders. 
We use the trade and order book data provided 
by Thomson Reuters Tick History database from 
January 1996 to June 2012 for all warrants and their 
underlying stocks. The trade file contains the trade 
time, record type (trade or quote), trade price, 
trading volume (in a number of hundred shares), 
best bid and ask prices, and best bid and ask sizes 
(in number of hundred shares). The order book file 
contains bid and ask prices and sizes up to the best 
three quotes on each side of the book.  
Figure 1 shows that from 1996 to 2012 trading 
in warrants is quite active, especially after the 
second half of 1997 when the July trading volume is 
even higher than that of the underlying stocks. 
During the study period of 1996-2012, 270 
companies were identified to have warrants trading 
on the SET. These warrants represent an average 
                                                          
1 Conditionally published orders allow a trader to reveal some portion of his 
or her order size and hide the remaining order from the public. 
monthly trading volume more than half of the 
volume traded by their underlying stocks.2 
Many previous studies (Mcinish and Wood 
(1992), Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995), and Chan, 
Chung, and Johnson (1995)) utilize a 30-minute 
interval in their intraday analysis. However, the 
popularity of algorithmic trading in recent years 
suggests that a higher frequency interval is more 
appropriate. We use a 1-minute interval and only 
select actively traded securities to a tradeoff 
between non-synchronous trading problems and 
stale trading problems.3 Ding and Charoenwong 
(2003) have shown that the bid-ask spread of thinly-
traded futures contracts computed from days 
without trades are less informative than those 
computed from days with trades. In the light of this 
finding, the following sample selection criteria are 
used. Each warrant and its underlying stock must 
have at least 40 trading days that both securities 
trade with each having more than 20 trades a day. 
Securities with very low prices are constrained by a 
minimum tick size and, consequently, have very 
large relative spreads. In order to reduce the impact 
of the minimum tick size on the relative spread, 
warrants and stocks trading below five baht are 
excluded. Ninety-one pairs of warrants and stocks 
meet these criteria with each having an average of 
261 trading days. These 91 warrants and stocks in 
the final sample represent more than 80% of the 
trading volume and the market capitalization of the 
original sample. They thus account for almost the 
entire original sample based on their market value 
and trading activity. Most of these warrants are long-
term call options, whose maturity ranges from one 
to five years. Given the long maturities, it is not 
surprising that most warrants are issued deep out-
of-the-money. The average prices of the warrants 
and underlying stocks vary from 5.34 to 222.27 baht 
and from 13.16 to 291.21 baht, respectively. 
The bid-ask spread is defined as the difference 
between the best bid and best ask prices divided by 
the midpoint of the quotes. The market depth is the 
value in baht of the orders which are posted at the 
best bid and ask quotes. The next 2-level depth or 
thickness of the book is the aggregation of the 
orders currently residing in the next two levels of 
the limit order book. The depth concentration is the 
ratio of market depth and the best three levels of 
the limit order book.  In addition, volatility, trading 
volume, and market order ratio are computed, where 
volatility is the average value of absolute returns, 
trading volume is measured in baht within an 
interval, and market order ratio is the number of 
market orders that arrive in the interval divided by 
all orders submitted at or better than the third bid-
ask prices in the book that arrived in the same 
interval. The prices of warrants and stocks in the 
sample range from 10 to 50 baht with a minimum 
tick size of 0.5% to 2.5%.4 The warrants have an 
average spread of 1.24%, which is higher than the 
stocks’ spread of 0.66%. The higher percentage 
                                                          
2 The high warrant trading volume is not surprising since there are several 
turbulent events in the data sample including: 1997 which was the year that 
the Asian Financial Crisis began; the 1998 Russian bond crisis; in 2001, the 
dot-com bubble burst; the 2007-2012 US subprime mortgage meltdown; and 
the 2011-2012 European debt crisis. The stock market was especially volatile 
in 1997 and warrants are the ideal vehicle for capitalizing on the volatility. 
3 Ideally, the intraday interval should be as short as possible to capture the 
details of the patterns.  
4 The SET imposes various minimum tick sizes for warrants and stocks over 
the price range. A stock with a trading price of 5 baht has a minimum price 
change of 2%, while a stock price of 20 baht has a minimum price change of 
1%. 
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spreads of warrants than stocks reflect the higher 
risk of warrants. The cross-sectional average market 
depths are 27,592 warrant baht and 106,524 stock 
baht. 
Table 1 shows the cross-section statistics of the 
limit order book and trade in the morning and 
afternoon sessions of warrants and stocks, 
respectively. The parametric paired t-test is used to 
find any significant difference between variables in 
the morning and afternoon sessions. For the limit 
order book, the spread is the difference between the 
best ask and best bid price divided by the average of 
the bid and ask price. The spreads of warrants 
(stocks) are 1.64% (0.77%) in the morning and 1.18% 
(0.54%) in the afternoon. Higher spreads in the 
morning reflect the high level of information 
asymmetry given the overnight information that is 
yet to be incorporated into prices. This is consistent 
with studies that document lower information 
content earlier in the trading day (e.g., Biais et al. 
1995). Hu (2017) documents that options listing 
increases both informed and uninformed trading, 
with an asymmetrically larger uninformed trading 
component. In unreported results, we find that the 
average spread of 19 active pairs of warrants and 
stocks during the Thai Baht devaluation and 
financial crisis year of 1997 is 2.92% (1.86%) in the 
morning and 2.41% (1.5%) in the afternoon. The 
reduction of the minimum tick size in December 
1997, combined with the growth in trading volume 
over time, results in a decline in spreads over time.  
Market depth, the sum of shares standing at 
the best bid and the best ask of the limit order book, 
is lower in the morning than in the afternoon. The 
morning market depth of warrants is 2.6486 million 
baht and it rises slightly to 2.6984 million baht in 
the afternoon. The market depths of stocks are 
9.923 million baht in the morning and 12.6443 
million baht in the afternoon. We also compute the 
next 2-level depth which is the less aggressive orders 
standing in the book. Specifically, it is the sum of 
orders at the next two quotes on the bid and ask 
side. On the SET, the bid and ask up to five levels on 
each side of the book are visible to the trader. The 
next total depth of warrants and stocks are, on 
average, significantly higher in the afternoon than in 
the morning. A comparison of the order book in the 
morning and in the afternoon shows that the 
characteristics of an order book may follow a time-
varying pattern. 
We examine the aggressiveness of limit order 
submission using depth concentration which is the 
proportion of market depth and the sum of market 
depth and the next 2-level depth. The morning depth 
concentration of warrants is slightly higher than in 
the afternoon by 0.86% while the afternoon depth 
concentration of stocks is higher than in the 
morning by 1.07%. It indicates that warrant traders 
use more aggressive limit orders in the morning 
while stock traders submit more aggressive limit 
orders in the afternoon. Warrants and stocks have a 
higher market order flow relative to limit order 
arrivals at the three best quotes arrivals in the 
afternoon than in the morning. A comparison of the 
order flow in the morning and in the afternoon 
suggests the possibility of an intraday variation of 
orders. 
The number of warrant trades is higher than 
stock trades, and trades occur more frequently in 
the morning than in the afternoon. Warrants (stocks) 
have 270 (231) trades in the morning and 206 (195) 
trades in the afternoon. Trade size, measured in 
baht, is higher for stocks than warrants. In the 
morning session, warrant (stock) trade size is 47,000 
baht (103,200 baht) whereas, in the afternoon 
session, it is 50,700 baht (133,400 baht). Trading 
volume of warrants is higher in the morning than in 
the afternoon while the opposite holds for the stock 
trading volume. 
Both warrants and stocks have a higher return 
volatility in the morning than in the afternoon. This 
pattern is similar to those found in previous studies 
on options and stock markets (e.g., McInish and 
Wood 1992). The higher volatility in the morning 
session reflects the higher degree of uncertainty 
arising from the price discovery process at the 
market opening. 
Stocks show a higher level of toxic order flow 
than warrants. Both warrants and stocks have a 
higher VPIN in the morning than in the afternoon. 
This result combined with the finding that liquidity 
measured by spread and depth is lower in the 
morning than in the afternoon suggests that 
informed investors time their trades in accordance 
with the availability of liquidity.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Intraday variation of spreads, depth, market 
order, volume, volatility, and VPIN 
 
We regress spreads, depths, liquidity immediacy, 
volume, volatility, and market order ratio of 
warrants and their underlying stocks against dummy 
variables to capture the intraday variation while 
controlling for the day-of-the-week effect: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = ?̂? + ∑ 𝛽ℎ
9
ℎ=1
𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒ℎ,𝑡 + ∑ ?̂?𝑘
5
𝑘=1
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀?̂? 
 
subject to 
 
∑ 𝛽ℎ
9
ℎ=1
= 0, ∑ ?̂?𝑘
5
𝑘=1
= 0 
(1) 
 
where Y
t
 represents the 1-minute interval of the bid-
ask spread, market depth, next 2-level depth, depth 
concentration, market order flow, number of trades, 
trade size, trade volume, volatility, and VPIN. Dtime
h,t
 
are dummy variables that capture the 30-minute 
intraday variation and dweek
k,t
 are dummy variables 
that control for the day-of-the-week effect. 
To facilitate the interpretation of the dummy 
coefficients, the intercept and all dummy variables, 
with a constraint that the sum of dummy 
coefficients in the same group is zero, are included. 
This constraint prevents perfect multicollinearity. 
This scheme of dummy variables is used in several 
recent studies of the intraday pattern (see, for 
example, Ahn and Cheung 1999; Lehman and 
Modest 1994). The regression is performed for 91 
individual warrants and stocks. The intercept of the 
regression () represents the cross-sectional average 
value of the variable of interest. Note that the 
numbers of observations for each stock are not 
equal because non-active trading days are truncated. 
We estimate parameters in the regression by using 
the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) with the 
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Newey and West (1987) correction for an unknown 
form of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
While the spread is the most popular proxy for 
the price of liquidity, depths of a limit order book 
measure the size of liquidity. Lee et al. (1993) show 
that providers of liquidity use both depths and 
spreads to manage the risk of asymmetric 
information. Four variables are used in this study to 
constitute depths: market depth, displayed depth, 
total depth, and the ratio of the market depth to 
total depth or liquidity immediacy. A comparison of 
liquidity immediacy across different periods is used 
to reveal the change of market depth relative to total 
depth. 
According to Madhavan (1992), asymmetric 
information is resolved through trading. This 
explains the downward intraday pattern of spreads 
and the upward intraday pattern of market depth. In 
order to test whether asymmetric information falls 
over the course of trading, this study measures the 
high-frequency dynamics of flow toxicity using the 
procedure suggested by Easley, Lopez, and O’Hara 
(2012). They use volume synchronized probability of 
informed trading or VPIN to measure flow toxicity. 
VPIN has an advantage over other measures when 
measuring asymmetric information at a high-
frequency interval as it does not require an 
intermediate numerical estimation of unobservable 
parameters. Menkveld (2016) reviews the economics 
of high-frequency trading to single out the economic 
channels by which such trading affects market 
quality. Further, Brogaard, Carrion, Moyaert, 
Riordan, Shkilko, and Sokolov (2018) find that high 
frequency traders provide liquidity during extreme 
price movements by absorbing imbalances created 
by non-high frequency traders. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
4.1. Pattern of spreads 
 
From the regression in Equation (1), the cross-
sectional average bid-ask spread of warrants is 
1.24%, which is 0.72% wider than the stocks spread. 
This result indicates a higher execution cost in 
warrant trading compared to stock trading. The 
spread of actively traded stocks on the SET, 0.66%, is 
higher than the 0.6% of average stock spreads on the 
NYSE. However, it was lower than the 1.15% of 
average stock spreads on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) and the 1.73% of average stock spreads on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE).5 The intraday 
variation of relative spreads of warrants and stocks 
is shown in Tables 2 and 3. The bid-ask spread is 
highest between 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. Warrant 
and stock spread during this period are 0.48% and 
0.21% higher than the average spread in other 
periods. The dummy coefficients of most intervals in 
the morning are significantly positive. For warrants, 
the time interval coefficients starting from the last 
30-minute before the morning session break to the 
end of the trading day are significantly negative. For 
stocks, the dummy coefficients are significantly 
negative for the interval just before the morning 
session break and two 30-minute intervals before 
the end of the trading day. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
5
The average NYSE spread is from the 1994 NYSE Fact Book; the average 
TSE spread is from January 1991 to April 1993 (see Lehman and Modest 
1994). The average HKSE spread is from October 1996 to March 1994 (see 
Ahn and Cheung 1999).  
magnitude of the dummy interval coefficient 
monotonically declines to the lowest value of -0.35% 
for warrants and -0.17% for stocks during the last 30 
minutes of the trading day. Therefore, the spreads 
of both warrants and stocks have a similar 
downward pattern over trading time, with spreads 
highest right after market opening and lowest before 
market closing.6  
This result confirms the effect of market 
structure on the intraday pattern documented in 
Chan et al. (1995). The options traded on CBOE, 
which is a competitive dealer market, have narrower 
spreads at closing compared to their underlying 
stocks traded on the monopolistic specialist market 
of the NYSE. In contrast, warrants and their 
underlying stocks listed on the SET are traded under 
the same market structure and regulations, and both 
exhibit the same intraday reverse J-shaped pattern. 
The results of this study suggest that the pattern of 
stock spreads is similar to the bid-ask spread 
pattern on the NYSE, TSE, and HKSE (see Ahn and 
Cheung 1999; Lehman and Modest 1994; McInish 
and Wood 1992). Market close also appears to affect 
the day of the week pattern. As shown in Tables II 
and III, the spreads of warrants and stocks are 
highest on Tuesdays (Mondays), and they are 0.19% 
and 0.94% higher than other days of the week. Figure 
2 plots the intraday spread of warrants and stocks 
using 1-minute interval. The graph shows a 
downward trend in spreads over time; high spreads 
are observed after the market opens in both the 
morning and afternoon sessions.   
 
4.2. Pattern of depths 
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show that the cross-sectional 
active trading day weighted market depths of 
warrants and stocks are 2,759,200 baht and 
10,652,400 baht, respectively. Active stocks are 
likely to have thick depths and more active trading 
days, so stocks have higher cross-sectional day-
weighted market depths than the cross-sectional 
average market depth. The active trading day 
weighted next 2-level depths of warrants and stocks 
are 11,120,500 baht and 31,136,800 baht, 
respectively. Both types of depth are low at the 
opening and continually increase to their highest 
level at the closing. Compared to spreads, the 
intraday pattern of market depth is a reversed image 
of the intraday spread pattern. As shown in Figure 3, 
market depth is lowest at the opening and 
monotonically increases to its highest level at the 
closing.  
While both market depths and the next-2 level 
depths increase over the course of the trading day, 
the depth concentration of warrants and stocks 
follows a U-shaped pattern with a cross-sectional 
average of 23.25% and 23.85%, respectively. The 
depth concentration ratio can be viewed as a proxy 
for the degree of the limit order trader’s willingness 
to supply liquidity. The depth concentrations are 
less than one-third, suggesting either that a limit 
order trader on average demands more 
compensation for providing liquidity than the 
spread or that there is a high degree of front-
running activity among limit order traders. The U-
shape pattern of depth concentration shown in 
                                                          
6 This study also examines intraday variation of absolute spread and it 
indicates that the downward pattern is being driven by the spread not by the 
quote mid-point. Results are available upon request. 
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Figure 4 suggests an active competition among limit 
order traders during the market open and close.  
When compared to the NYSE, the results in this 
study concur with Lee et al.’s (1993) assertion that 
the liquidity supplied by limit order traders in a 
limit order book of warrants and stocks is reflected 
in both spreads and depths.  
 
4.3. The pattern of market order, volume, and 
volatility 
 
The average values of the market order ratio across 
all time intervals are 23.20% for warrants and 20.82% 
for stocks. As shown in Table 2 and Table 3, the 
market order ratio is lowest during the first 30-
minute interval and increases to its highest level 
during the last 30-minute interval. There is also a 
lunch-break effect for market order submissions. 
Right before the lunch break, the market order ratio 
rises significantly. After the lunch break, the market 
order ratio falls during the first 30-minute interval 
before increasing. During the afternoon session, the 
market order ratio rises steadily and increases 
significantly during several periods before market 
closing. This pattern is likely to reflect the activity of 
day-trade investor who does not want to hold a 
position overnight. In general, warrants and stocks 
show the upward pattern of the market order ratio. 
An increase in market order submissions is 
consistent with the increase of market depths and 
the decrease of spreads. This shows that market 
order traders consume the liquidity supplied by 
limit order traders.  
The intraday pattern of spreads, depths, and 
market order submissions supports the hypothesis 
that investors strategically submit more (less) 
market orders when the spread, which is the cost of 
submission, is low (high) and when market depths 
are high (low) (see Bae et al. 2003; Biais et al. 1995). 
Keim and Madhavan (1995) show that institutional 
liquidity traders, such as index fund managers, tend 
to use market orders. This observation is consistent 
with the results of this study, which show a large 
increase in market orders during market closing. A 
comparison of the market order ratio between 
warrants and stocks is shown in Figure 5, which 
illustrates the similarity in their intraday patterns. 
As shown in Table 2 and 3, the coefficients of a 
number of trades, trade size, trading volume, and 
volatility are significantly positive at the first and 
last trading intervals. There is evidence of a U-
shaped pattern in the number of trades, trade size, 
and trading volume, confirming the same pattern 
found in many other markets, including U.S. 
markets, which have specialists and dealers to 
provide liquidity as a last resort, and pure limit 
order markets, such as those or the TSE, the Paris 
Bourse, and the HKSE. Figure 6 shows that the 
intraday variation of warrants and stocks trading 
volume on SET follows a U-shaped pattern. 
Consistent with previous studies, volatility of both 
warrants and stocks also exhibits a U-shaped 
pattern. The highest level of volatility occurs at the 
first trading interval of the day, and it falls before 
increasing again during the closing interval. The 
impact of trade discontinuity due to the two-hour 
lunch break does not appear in the intraday 
volatility pattern. Figure 7 presents the intraday 
pattern of volatility. 
 
4.4. VPIN and flow toxicity 
 
As shown in Table 2 and 3, the cross-sectional mean 
of VPIN varies from 19.9% to 33.7% for warrants and 
from 24.9% to 40.3% for stocks. VPIN is high at the 
market open but falls monotonically over time until 
the lunch break, after which it starts to rise again 
until its highest level at market closing. Figure 8 
shows the U-shaped pattern of the VPIN of warrants 
and stocks. 
The findings in the present study show that the 
adverse selection cost declines over time. Madhavan 
(1992) notes that the adverse selection problem can 
be resolved by trading. This implies that on the SET 
the adverse selection component at the open is 
higher than during trading intervals throughout the 
day, and it is lowest at the close. Other models 
report a higher adverse selection component at the 
close. This may be a result of strategic order 
submissions by informed traders. Handa and 
Schwartz (1996) and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) 
show that limit orders placed at the best or better 
than the prevailing quotes yield superior returns to 
limit orders placed behind the book and market 
order. As a result, to maximize the value of their 
information, informed traders may use a marketable 
limit order7 but, if no execution occurs before 
market close, they may switch to a market order for 
immediate execution. Therefore, liquidity providers 
before the close will demand compensation for 
having to face a higher asymmetric information cost. 
However, as noted by Ahn et al. (2002), all of the 
models assume that information is immediately 
impounded to price after each trade. If the trading 
pattern is endogenously determined and lagged 
trades and quotes have an impact on current trades 
and quotes, the vector autoregressive model of 
Hasbrouck (1988) may be more appropriate. 
 
4.5. Association of flow toxicity, limit order book, 
and trades 
 
The results of the present study show that spread 
declines over the trading day, while market depth, 
next 2-level depth, and market order ratio increase. 
This study also examines the correlation between 
flow toxicity, spreads, and other variables, including 
depths, depth concentration, market order ratio, 
trade size, trading volume, and volatility, when the 
intraday pattern is and is not controlled. Table 4 
and 5 show that without controlling for intraday 
intervals, the flow toxicity is negatively associated 
with a spread for both warrants and stocks. The 
correlations of VPIN and spread are -0.20 for 
warrants and -0.19 for stocks. However, VPIN is 
positively related to depths for both warrants (0.27) 
and stocks (0.27). This suggests that the presence of 
an informed trader occurs concurrently with the 
availability of liquidity.  
There is almost no correlation between flow 
toxicity and depth concentration but there is a 
strong positive correlation with the market order 
ratio and trade size. This evidence indicates that 
informed traders not only seek liquidity but they 
also design their order strategy so as to minimize 
trading costs and maximize the benefits from their 
information advantage by using market orders with 
a large trade size. Flow toxicity is positively 
                                                          
7 A marketable limit order is a limit order placed at the best quote. 
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associated with volatility. Consistent with the price 
discovery process, trading by informed traders 
incorporates information into prices, thereby 
moving the price toward its fundamental value and 
increasing volatility.  
However, the correlation of VPIN and the other 
variables may arise from a strong relationship in a 
certain period of the day, especially during the 
opening and closing periods. In order to confirm 
whether such relationships occur during a specific 
period of a trading day, this study examines 
correlation at each trading interval. As shown in 
Table 4 and 5, the association of VPIN and other 
variables across the trading day and across 
weekdays is not sharply different from relationships 
that have not been controlled for time variations. 
This shows that the intraday effect has little impact 
on the relationship between flow toxicity and other 
variables. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results of this study show that market structure 
has a significant effect on the intraday pattern of 
spreads, depth, market order ratio, volatility, and 
volume. The results show that warrants and stocks 
have wider spreads at the open, and these spreads 
become gradually narrower until they reach their 
lowest level at the close. These findings support the 
idea that market structure influences intraday 
patterns.  
The intraday pattern of trade and quote 
variables for both warrants and stocks traded on the 
SET are compared in this study. If their patterns 
diverge significantly, it may be possible for an astute 
trader to devise profitable arbitrage strategies 
during the life of the warrants. This paper finds that 
the intraday patterns of spreads, depth, market 
order ratio, volatility, and volume are similar for 
both warrants and stocks. Although five warrants 
are in the top 20 for trading volume during 1997, 
which indicates a relatively high liquidity of 
warrants compared to stocks, generally, the intraday 
spreads, depths, depth concentration, market order 
ratio, trading volume, volatility, and flow toxicity of 
warrants and stocks have a similar pattern. 
Percentage spreads are the highest at the opening, 
monotonically decrease during the day, and are 
lowest at the closing. Moreover, warrant spreads are 
higher than stock spreads for the whole period. The 
market depths, the next 2-level depths, and market 
order ratio are lowest in the opening interval and 
increase to their highest level at market closing. The 
depth concentration, trading volume, volatility and 
flow toxicity have a U-shaped pattern. The volatility 
of warrants is higher than stocks, but the flow 
toxicity of stocks is higher than that of warrants.  
This study also shows the negative association 
of flow toxicity and spreads. Depths, market order 
ratio, trade size, trading volume, and volatility all 
have a positive association with flow toxicity. These 
relationships occur in all time intervals, so they do 
not occur because of a strong relationship in a 
specific interval. The inverse relationship between 
VPIN and spread supports the notion that informed 
traders consider liquidity when managing their 
submission strategy. The positive correlation 
between flow toxicity and market order ratio implies 
a strategic market order submission by an informed 
trader. The positive association of flow toxicity and 
volatility is evidence of permanent price movement 
as a result of informed trading.  
Given recent advances in trading platforms and 
new technologies, it would be interesting for future 
research to examine patterns of trades and orders 
from online trading platforms that capture even 
higher frequencies of trading and even more precise 
timestamps in the nano-seconds, which are absent in 
the current research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
VPIN Measurement 
 
Easley, Lopez and O’Hara (2012) suggest a procedure to measure flow toxicity based on volume synchronized probability of informed trading: 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑁 ≈
∑ |𝑣𝜏
𝐵 − 𝑣𝜏
𝑆|𝑛𝜏=1
𝑛𝑉
 (2) 
 
where 𝑣𝜏
𝐵 and 𝑣𝜏
𝑆 represent buy and sell volumes included in the τ volume bucket, and n is the number of buckets used to approximate the expected trade imbalance. 
Following Easley, Lopez and O’Hara (2012), we use n=50 buckets so V is 1/50 of the average daily volume. We classify each trade based on the Lee and Ready (1991) 
algorithm. A trade is buyer-initiated if price is above the midpoint, and vice versa.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of limit order book and trade of warrants and stocks 
 
 Morning Afternoon  
 Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Diff t-stats 
Panel A: Warrants 
Spread 1.64% 1.58% 0.80% 1.18% 1.19% 0.91% 0.46% 5.38 
At the Market Depth  26,486 5,033 104,070 26,984 5,691 100,011 -498 -0.93 
Next 2-Level Depth 125,344 15,963 471,769 128,722 20,228 479,409 -3,378 -2.24 
Depth Concentration 24.44% 23.68% 3.91% 23.59% 23.02% 2.29% 0.86% 2.49 
Market Order Flow 24.04% 24.61% 2.23% 26.25% 26.76% 2.83% -2.20% -10.88 
Number of Trades 0.63 0.48 0.47 0.60 0.43 0.44 0.03 4.38 
Trade Size 470 157 1423 507 175 1563 -37 -2.43 
Trading volume 2,259 384 10,990 2,079 364 9,920 180 1.58 
Volatility 0.123% 0.118% 0.063% 0.099% 0.100% 0.033% 0.025% 4.33 
VPIN 0.217 0.194 0.096 0.232 0.209 0.093 -0.015 -11.59 
Panel B: Stocks 
Spread 0.77% 0.79% 1.75% 0.54% 0.73% 2.27% 0.23% 1.50 
At the Market Depth  99,230 27,733 341,995 126,443 36,372 442,432 -27,213 -2.27 
Next 2-Level Depth 316,350 84,154 1,122,322 374,153 94,263 1,370,436 -57,803 -1.95 
Depth Concentration 23.38% 22.50% 2.60% 24.45% 24.02% 2.26% -1.07% -5.81 
Market Order Flow 21.05% 21.13% 2.28% 23.96% 23.55% 2.88% -2.91% -14.82 
Number of Trades 0.79 0.64 0.58 0.81 0.62 0.58 -0.02 -1.89 
Trade Size 1032 595 2430 1,334 757 3,391 -302 -2.59 
Trading volume 4,433 1,321 14,012 5,273 1,756 18,886 - 840 -1.39 
Volatility 0.073% 0.070% 0.023% 0.071% 0.068% 0.031% 0.002% 0.74 
VPIN 0.262 0.251 0.124 0.289 0.275 0.129 -0.027 -14.75 
Note. This table presents the cross-sectional statistics of the limit order book and trades in the morning and afternoon sessions. Spread is the best ask minus the best bid prices divided by the midpoint of 
the bid and ask prices. At the market depth is the sum of shares in hundred baht at the best quotes in the limit order book. Next 2-Level depth is the sum of shares in hundred baht at the next two quotes in the 
limit order book. Depth concentration is the ratio between at the market depth and next 2-level depth. Market order flow is the proportion of the number of market orders to the number of limit orders 
submitted at or better than the 3rd level in the limit order book. Trade size and trading volume are measured in hundreds of baht. Volatility is the absolute percentage price change. VPIN is the volume 
synchronized probability of informed trading computed by the Easley, Lopez and O’Hara (2012) method.  
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Table 2. Intraday patterns of warrants 
 
 Spread 
At the market 
depth 
Next 2-level 
depth 
Depth 
concentration 
Market order 
flow 
Number of 
trades 
Trade Size 
Trading 
volume 
Volatility VPIN 
Constant 1.238*** 27.592*** 111.205*** 23.247*** 23.202*** 0.709*** 0.475*** 1.668*** 0.103*** 0.318*** 
10:00–10:30 0.477*** -2.770*** -17.813*** 2.069*** -1.936*** 0.455*** 0.147*** 1.218*** 0.093*** -0.009*** 
10:30–11:00 0.335*** -0.788*** -3.860*** 0.379*** -1.053*** 0.102*** 0.036*** 0.186*** 0.020*** -0.048*** 
11:00–11:30 0.125*** -0.227 1.788** -0.288*** -0.568*** -0.077*** -0.045*** -0.191*** -0.009*** -0.086*** 
11:30–12:00 0.020* 0.313 3.552*** -0.682*** -0.372*** -0.166*** -0.089*** -0.412*** -0.027*** -0.107*** 
12:00–12:30 -0.023** 0.163 4.421*** -0.937*** 0.597*** -0.228*** -0.123*** -0.587*** -0.038*** -0.119*** 
14:30–15:00 -0.183*** 0.115 5.433*** -0.660*** 0.015 -0.107*** -0.042*** -0.265*** -0.016*** -0.094*** 
15:00–15:30 -0.166*** 0.443* 5.253*** -0.503*** 0.089 -0.117*** -0.044*** -0.274*** -0.021*** -0.088*** 
15:30–16:00 -0.241*** 0.613*** 3.487*** -0.407*** 0.528*** -0.087*** -0.012*** -0.174*** -0.020*** -0.077*** 
16:00–16:30 -0.345*** 2.136*** -2.263*** 1.027*** 2.700*** 0.226*** 0.171*** 0.499*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
Monday 0.001 -2.894*** -6.559*** 0.103*** 0.040 -0.050*** -0.019*** -0.112*** -0.006** -0.008*** 
Tuesday 0.191*** -1.563*** -2.483*** 0.131*** 0.093 -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.126*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
Wednesday -0.155*** 1.484*** 0.060*** 0.083*** 0.096* 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.046*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 
Thursday -0.199*** 1.497*** 6.343*** -0.146*** -0.071 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.005 0.004 0.004*** 
Friday 0.163*** 1.476*** 2.638*** -0.171*** -0.159*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.187*** -0.001 0.004*** 
Note. The intraday patterns of interested variables are estimated as follows:  
𝑌𝑡
1−𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽ℎ
9
ℎ=1
𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒ℎ,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑘
5
𝑘=1
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
∑ 𝛽ℎ
9
ℎ=1
= 0, ∑ 𝑦𝑘
5
𝑘=1
= 0 
 
where Y1-min
t
 denotes the variables of interest measured at 1-minute interval consisting of spread, at-the-market depth, next 2-level depth, depth concentration, market order ratio, number of trades, trade size, 
trading volume, volatility, and VPIN. For each warrant, these variables are regressed against a set of dummies and controlled variables. This table reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients. The 
statistical significance is based on the signed tests on the estimated coefficients, where ***, **, and * indicate a 99%, 95% and 90% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Governance and Control: Financial Markets & Institutions/ Volume 8, Issue 3, 2018 
 
55 
Table 3.  Intraday patterns of stocks 
 
 Spread 
At the market 
depth 
Next 2-level 
depth 
Depth 
concentration 
Market order 
ratio 
Number of 
trades 
Trade Size 
Trading 
volume 
Volatility VPIN 
Constant 0.657*** 106.524*** 311.368*** 23.848*** 20.818*** 0.858*** 1.185*** 4.078*** 0.072*** 0.382*** 
10:00–10:30 0.208*** -33.896*** -84.945*** 0.025 -2.497*** 0.429*** 0.127*** 1.593*** 0.054*** -0.026*** 
10:30–11:00 0.110*** -17.734*** -34.650*** -0.985*** -1.648*** 0.076*** -0.073*** -0.122 0.006*** -0.066*** 
11:00–11:30 0.088*** -7.431*** -9.092*** -0.984*** -1.106*** -0.107*** -0.135*** -0.212* -0.011*** -0.100*** 
11:30–12:00 -0.020 -1.009 4.987*** -0.806*** -0.636*** -0.200*** -0.255*** -0.902*** -0.019*** -0.123*** 
12:00–12:30 -0.114*** 2.796*** 16.766*** -0.663*** 0.719*** -0.262*** -0.301*** -1.376*** -0.022*** -0.133*** 
14:30–15:00 -0.016 7.602*** 30.634*** -0.136*** 0.079* -0.085*** 0.016 -0.124 -0.009*** -0.098*** 
15:00–15:30 -0.007 12.387*** 34.616*** 0.191*** 0.144*** -0.099*** -0.016 -0.382*** -0.009*** -0.091*** 
15:30–16:00 -0.169*** 18.155*** 32.745*** 0.902*** 0.845*** -0.069*** 0.068*** -0.272*** -0.010*** -0.076*** 
16:00–16:30 -0.079*** 19.131*** 8.939*** 2.455*** 4.101*** 0.316*** 0.568*** 1.795*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
Monday 0.935*** -16.335*** -29.276*** 0.277*** 0.127*** -0.029*** -0.052*** 0.016 -0.004*** -0.008*** 
Tuesday 0.303*** -2.413*** 1.161 0.096*** -0.068** -0.028*** -0.046*** -0.370*** -0.003*** -0.010*** 
Wednesday -0.659*** -0.118 -1.087 0.212*** -0.028 0.012*** 0.005 -0.093 0.004*** -0.002*** 
Thursday -0.389*** 13.820*** 16.768*** -0.265*** 0.057** 0.020*** 0.066*** 0.240*** 0.000 0.000*** 
Friday -0.190*** 5.046*** 12.434*** -0.320*** -0.089*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.207*** 0.001 0.002*** 
Note. The intraday patterns of interested variables are estimated as follows:  
𝑌𝑡
1−𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽ℎ
9
ℎ=1
𝑑𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒ℎ,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑘
5
𝑘=1
𝑑𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
∑ 𝛽ℎ
9
ℎ=1
= 0, ∑ 𝑦𝑘
5
𝑘=1
= 0 
 
where Y1-min
t
 denotes the variables of interest measured at 1-minute interval consisting of spread, at-the-market depth, next 2-level depth, depth concentration, market order ratio, number of trades, trade size, 
trading volume, volatility, and VPIN. For each stock, these variables are regressed against a set of dummies and controlled variables. This table reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficients. The 
statistical significance is based on the signed tests on the estimated coefficients, where ***, **, and * indicate a 99%, 95% and 90% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Spearman correlation of flow toxicity (VPIN) with limit order book and trade characteristics of warrants 
 
 Spread 
At the market 
depth 
Next 2-level depth 
Depth 
concentration 
Market order ratio Trade Size Trading volume Volatility 
Constant -0.2046*** 0.2712*** 0.3453*** -0.0136*** 0.8555*** 0.9293*** 0.9165*** 0.1999*** 
10:00–10:30 -0.1908*** 0.2381*** 0.2886*** 0.0013 0.8870*** 0.9571*** 0.9499*** 0.1718*** 
10:30–11:00 -0.1681*** 0.2160*** 0.2571*** 0.0094*** 0.9032*** 0.9714*** 0.9668*** 0.1712*** 
11:00–11:30 -0.1480*** 0.1985*** 0.2340*** 0.0091*** 0.9132*** 0.9773*** 0.9738*** 0.1690*** 
11:30–12:00 -0.1406*** 0.1907*** 0.2252*** 0.0117*** 0.9206*** 0.9819*** 0.9793*** 0.1573*** 
12:00–12:30 -0.1452*** 0.1931*** 0.2360*** 0.0156*** 0.9060*** 0.9734*** 0.9692*** 0.1784*** 
14:30–15:00 -0.1477*** 0.1936*** 0.2348*** 0.0049*** 0.9017*** 0.9730*** 0.9688*** 0.1603*** 
15:00–15:30 -0.1414*** 0.2003*** 0.2410*** 0.0182*** 0.8991*** 0.9696*** 0.9650*** 0.1540*** 
15:30–16:00 -0.1248*** 0.2183*** 0.2613*** 0.0383*** 0.8366*** 0.9335*** 0.9227*** 0.1229*** 
16:00–16:30 -0.1526*** 0.2127*** 0.2617*** 0.0206*** 0.8930*** 0.9683*** 0.9632*** 0.1685*** 
Monday -0.1550*** 0.2082*** 0.2550*** 0.0159*** 0.8920*** 0.9678*** 0.9626*** 0.1751*** 
Tuesday -0.1517*** 0.2116*** 0.2546*** 0.0146*** 0.8897*** 0.9639*** 0.9579*** 0.1743*** 
Wednesday -0.1594*** 0.2099*** 0.2487*** 0.0188*** 0.8902*** 0.9634*** 0.9575*** 0.1753*** 
Thursday -0.1566*** 0.2185*** 0.2546*** 0.0160*** 0.8915*** 0.9632*** 0.9573*** 0.1718*** 
Friday -0.2046*** 0.2712*** 0.3453*** -0.0136*** 0.8555*** 0.9293*** 0.9165*** 0.1999*** 
Note: The computation of the volume synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) follows the procedure suggested by Easley, Lopez and O’Hara (2012). VPIN measures the flow toxicity and is 
captured by: 
𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑁 ≈
∑ |𝑣𝜏
𝐵 − 𝑣𝜏
𝑆|𝑛𝜏=1
𝑛𝑉
 
 
We use n=50 bucket so V is 1/50 of the average daily volume and classify each trade based on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. A trade is buyer-initiated if price is above the midpoint, and vice 
versa. Statistical significance is based on signed tests of the estimated coefficients, where ***, **, and * indicate a 99%, 95% and 90% significance level, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Spearman correlation of flow toxicity (VPIN) with limit order book and trade characteristics of stocks 
 
 Spread 
At the market 
depth 
Next 2-level depth 
Depth 
concentration 
Market order ratio Trade Size Trading volume Volatility 
Constant -0.1860*** 0.2699*** 0.2861*** -0.0199*** 0.8412*** 0.9095*** 0.8952*** 0.1675*** 
10:00–10:30 -0.1679*** 0.2576*** 0.2589*** 0.0194*** 0.8843*** 0.9436*** 0.9355*** 0.1438*** 
10:30–11:00 -0.1500*** 0.2419*** 0.2472*** 0.0168*** 0.9079*** 0.9605*** 0.9552*** 0.1328*** 
11:00–11:30 -0.1315*** 0.2237*** 0.2333*** 0.0122*** 0.9180*** 0.9687*** 0.9647*** 0.1308*** 
11:30–12:00 -0.1317*** 0.2213*** 0.2327*** 0.0109*** 0.9241*** 0.9738*** 0.9705*** 0.1240*** 
12:00–12:30 -0.1382*** 0.2274*** 0.2390*** 0.0086*** 0.9051*** 0.9599*** 0.9546*** 0.1374*** 
14:30–15:00 -0.1367*** 0.2313*** 0.2451*** 0.0092*** 0.9014*** 0.9585*** 0.9532*** 0.1238*** 
15:00–15:30 -0.1300*** 0.2394*** 0.2537*** 0.0144*** 0.8920*** 0.9534*** 0.9475*** 0.1181*** 
15:30–16:00 -0.1210*** 0.2476*** 0.2565*** 0.0288*** 0.8111*** 0.9029*** 0.8896*** 0.1009*** 
16:00–16:30 -0.1421*** 0.2410*** 0.2497*** 0.0096*** 0.8913*** 0.9529*** 0.9464*** 0.1382*** 
Monday -0.1401*** 0.2300*** 0.2385*** 0.0156*** 0.8928*** 0.9537*** 0.9474*** 0.1391*** 
Tuesday -0.1384*** 0.2366*** 0.2449*** 0.0181*** 0.8884*** 0.9502*** 0.9433*** 0.1381*** 
Wednesday -0.1452*** 0.2313*** 0.2384*** 0.0166*** 0.8867*** 0.9490*** 0.9420*** 0.1394*** 
Thursday -0.1471*** 0.2415*** 0.2469*** 0.0207*** 0.8857*** 0.9483*** 0.9411*** 0.1402*** 
Friday -0.1860*** 0.2699*** 0.2861*** -0.0199*** 0.8412*** 0.9095*** 0.8952*** 0.1675*** 
Note: The computation of the volume synchronized probability of informed trading (VPIN) follows the procedure suggested by Easley, Lopez and O’Hara (2012). VPIN measures the flow toxicity and is 
captured by: 
𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑁 ≈
∑ |𝑣𝜏
𝐵 − 𝑣𝜏
𝑆|𝑛𝜏=1
𝑛𝑉
 
 
We use n=50 bucket so V is 1/50 of the average daily volume and classify each trade based on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. A trade is buyer-initiated if price is above the midpoint, and vice 
versa. Statistical significance is based on signed tests of the estimated coefficients, where ***, **, and * indicate a 99%, 95% and 90% significance level, respectively.
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Figure 1. Daily trading volume of warrants and stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Intraday spread of warrants and stocks 
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Figure 3. Intraday pattern of at the market depth of warrants and stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Intraday pattern of depth concentration of warrants and stocks 
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Figure 5. Intraday pattern of market order flow of warrants and stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Intraday pattern of trading volume of warrants and stocks 
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Figure 7. Intraday pattern of volatility of warrants and stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Intraday pattern of VPIN of warrants and stocks 
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